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PETER S. MENELL** AND JOHN P. DWYER*** 
Like the metaphorical bundle of sticks that Property professors invoke to 
illustrate the evolution of the concept of property from a unified whole to an 
infinitely divisible and fungible set of rights, the property course has become a 
bundle of topics that professors can liberally mix and match.  But such 
malleability has come at a high cost.  Students suffer when their property 
course lacks a cohesive framework upon which they can layer other concepts 
and subjects in advanced courses.  Few students, save those with photographic 
memories, are able to retain much from a course that comes across as 
disconnected bodies of doctrine whose only common element may be that they 
involve land.  More generally, the law school curriculum suffers because 
professors in upper level courses cannot be sure students have acquired the 
foundational concepts upon which they can build their courses. 
This lack of cohesion has eroded Property’s place in the firmament of first-
year courses.  Unlike the other first-year courses, which have retained central 
organizing themes—Contracts (private ordering through assent), Tort (default 
rules for assigning responsibility for accidents), Civil Procedure (rules for 
litigating disputes), and Criminal Law (justifications and rules for punishing 
crimes)—Property has devolved into a disparate set of doctrinal areas loosely 
tied together by their relationship to land.  Each Property professor has his or 
her potpourri of coverage, and most modern property books largely reflect and 
cater to that eclecticism.  Although only one school (Yale) has demoted 
Property to elective status, many law schools, including our own, have reduced 
the number of credit hours absolutely and in relation to the other first-year 
courses; some have moved it to the second semester or offer it during either 
semester, further evidence that Property is less essential. 
This de-emphasis of Property finds some support in legal scholarship.  In a 
provocative essay published two decades ago, Professor Thomas Grey argued 
that the field of property  “ceases to be an important category in legal and 
political theory” as a result of the “disintegration” of the conception of 
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property.1  In his view, dividing property ownership into a “bundle of rights” 
and developing differing conceptions of property across disciplines have 
“fragmented” property theory “into a set of discontinuous usages.”2  Numerous 
scholars have questioned Grey’s claims on a range of bases,3 yet Grey’s 
observation about the disintegration of property still resonates today; there is 
no overarching conception unifying the many elements of the field in a deep 
and intuitive way. The traditional unifying theory—Hohfeldian’s 
correlatives4—is principally definitional.  The justificatory theories stand 
largely disassociated from the richness of real world property institutions.  The 
burgeoning literature on property institutions has illuminated the many 
governance regimes beyond private property, but has not provided an 
integrated and generally accepted comparative framework for integrating these 
diverse strands.5  Robert Ellickson’s Property in Land6 provides the most 
comprehensive effort to date at synthesizing the various strands of property 
 
 1. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII 69, 81 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).  See also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,  111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001). 
 2. Id. at 72. 
 3. Professor Munzer, in particular, provides a persuasive critique of Grey’s premises and 
logical deductions.  STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31-36 (1990).  Judging from 
the proliferation of property scholarship on property theory over the past decade, there is little 
question that the field of property is vibrant today.  See, e.g., MANAGING THE COMMONS (John A. 
Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: 
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); 
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); CAROL 
M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF 
OWNERSHIP (1994); Joseph Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); JEREMY WALDRON, 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). 
 4. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING 23-114 (1919); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC 
FOUNDATION 7-23 (1977).  See also A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 1st series 1961).  This conception is reflected in the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of Property. 
 5. Professor Neil Komesar’s work broadly conceptualizes all of law and public policy 
within a comparative institutional framework.  See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).  
While properly calling attention to the importance of institutional choice, Komesar’s framework 
operates at too general a level to expose many of the distinctive aspects of governing resources.  
Furthermore, the model of politics upon which he bases his analysis—the interest group theory of 
politics—represents but one of the major political theories important to understanding property 
institutions. 
 6. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
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theory into a positive model, but it limits its scope to land and focuses 
principally upon one critical element of land regimes: parcelization versus 
group ownership. 
In our view, the perception that a property course is somehow less 
foundational to the study of law reflects the lack of a cohesive framework for 
organizing the course rather than a reduced importance of Property to the law 
school curriculum, the practice of law or the formation of public policy.  To 
the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the production and allocation 
of resources continue to represent central problems in modern societies.  
Ironically, the growing importance of a wider range of resources—beyond 
simply land—has contributed to the erosion of the intellectual coherence of the 
property course, and at the same time has illustrated the need for a unifying 
intellectual framework. 
It was this challenge that prompted us to write a new coursebook for 
property law.7  Although we covered the disparate areas that professors 
commonly pull into the property course, we developed an organizational 
structure that weaves together the various subjects in a cohesive and intuitive 
manner and that serves as a foundation for the broad range of subjects covered 
in law school: from environmental law to intellectual property, trusts and 
estates, real estate, administrative law, local government law, land use 
planning, business associations, bankruptcy, tax and family law. 
Our point of departure is the basic observation that one of the central 
problems of every society throughout history has been the governance of 
resources.  Land is obviously an important category, and historically, often has 
been the most important resource, but it is by no means the only important 
resource, and its relative importance varies over time and across societies.  In 
today’s economy, for example, information—knowledge and ideas—plays a 
much greater role than it did a century ago when Christopher Columbus 
Landgell devised his blueprint for the “modern” law school curriculum.  Even 
though it may emphasize real property as a resource, a truly foundational 
property course must provide a conceptual framework that applies to the full 
panoply of resources. 
From this starting point, it became clear that there are many different 
means of governing property and that we need both a language and a 
framework to describe how such governance occurs and evolves over time.  
The literature on comparative institutional analysis provides such a vocabulary 
and the tools for developing such a framework.  Although one institution may 
dominate the governance of resources for a particular society at a particular 
point in time—and clearly private property, a mixture of default ownership 
rules and market exchange, played such a role at the time that Langdell 
 
 7. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998). 
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constructed the first-year curriculum long ago—any theory of governance also 
must allow for the operation of other institutions, such as social norms and 
politics. 
By changing the organizational structure for the course from a particular 
resource (land) and a particular institution (judge-made rules) to a comparative 
institutional analysis—one that looks at default legal rules, social norms, 
markets and political institutions—we have developed a cohesive 
understanding of the governance of all kinds of resources and an appreciation 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the major governance institutions.  This 
orientation updates the first-year curriculum in other important ways.  The 
traditional first-year subjects, drawn as they are from the common law mold of 
the late nineteenth century, overemphasize the role of legal institutions and 
common law.8  However, a property course organized around the principal 
institutions of governance is more adapted to today’s legal environment and 
the practice of law.  Such a course can teach not only about the range of 
governance institutions, but also about the processes underlying their 
operation.  In this way, the approach that we advocate can be seen as an 
effective way of integrating the concepts set forth by Hart and Sacks in their 
widely admired, but rarely taught The Legal Process,9 into a substantive first-
year course. 
Implementation is key.  At first blush, this approach may seem to engage 
students in more abstract theory than most professors may want to explore; in 
fact, our course allows professors to cover the same substantive topics.  But as 
the course moves among these topics, students can see how the subjects and 
concepts fit within a larger, coherent landscape that puts the law school 
curriculum, the practice of law and the relation of law and society in sharper 
focus.  Thus, students derive a significant additional benefit: a means for 
organizing key concepts that will serve them well in a wide range of advanced 
courses—the very reason for including a course in the mandatory first year 
curriculum—and the practice of law.  As with Contracts, Torts, Civil 
Procedure and Criminal Law, Property can be summarized in a phrase: 
exploring and comparing the principal institutions for governing resources. 
I.  DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPERTY COURSE 
Many property casebooks have a common starting point: Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the foundational case setting forth the American origins of property 
 
 8. Had the law school curriculum been developed following the New Deal, the role of the 
state, statutes (and statutory interpretation) and administrative law undoubtedly would occupy a 
more prominent role in the first-year curriculum, including Property. 
 9. HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994) (prepared for publication from the 1958 
Tentative Edition by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey). 
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rights as between native peoples and European colonists.  As Professor Singer 
explains in his contribution to this symposium, this case represents a logical 
starting point for developing an understanding of the law of property.10  Yet, 
this case creates the feeling that students are entering the river at midstream.  
Surely the native peoples had governance institutions before the Europeans 
arrived.  Whether or not Justice Marshall was right largely to override native 
property rights, it seems worth exploring how native Americans governed land 
and natural resources, just as it makes sense to think about how Europeans 
governed land and natural resources.  Underlying this inquiry is our belief that 
successful lawyers must be able to think about more than what the formal law 
says; they must be able to think about the range of governance—default legal 
rules, social norms, markets and political institutions—that is available to 
achieve their client’s objective(s).11 
Thus, even before learning the formal law, students need a theory about the 
governance of resources.  The real story underlying Johnson v. M’Intosh 
illuminates just such a theory.  Many students find Justice Marshall’s 
disparaging portrayal of native peoples’ use and enjoyment of the land and 
natural resources deeply troubling.  And they are correct.  Far from living 
barbarous, ignorant and unprincipled lives, native peoples possessed a rich 
understanding of the land and other resources on which they lived and had 
developed stable and effective governance institutions.  These institutions 
differed radically from those of the colonists, and these differences, rather than 
the decision itself, is the ideal starting point for the property course because it 
enables students to focus on the core problem facing individuals, 
organizations, communities and societies—the governance of resources.  Thus, 
while Johnson v. M’Intosh is an important decision for understanding property 
law, and it is the first case that we cover, the deeper importance derives from 
its comparison of different cultures’ resource governance regimes. 
This starting point reveals an intriguing puzzle: how can the same 
resources—the land, wild animals, fruits and berries, forest resources, fish, 
ocean resources, dwellings, tools—be governed so differently in the two 
communities?  Inviting students to explore this puzzle illuminates the 
governance of resources and provides the key to reunifying property. 
 
 10. See Joseph William Singer, Starting Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565 (2002). 
 11. In the United States today, study of law opens up a wide range of career paths, from 
working in traditional law practice to politics, business and civic affairs.  In the high technology 
world, lawyers work closely with entrepreneurs in navigating uncharted waters.  Even lawyers in 
more traditional jobs have occasion to deal with political and social institutions.  And even the 
most narrowly focused litigators must, when a settlement offer is on the table, be able to assist 
their client in weighing alternatives. 
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A. Understanding the Governance of Resources in Early New England 
After a brief review of the principal philosophical traditions, we bring 
students back to New England at the time that the colonists arrived, long 
before Johnson v. M’Intosh was decided. Historian William Cronon’s Changes 
in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England12 provides 
the time portal.  His richly textured portrayal of the manner in which native 
and colonial communities lived brings the reader back in time to villages and 
towns of early New England.  By excerpting the principal descriptive chapters 
of Cronon’s book, we are able to expose students—on the basis of sound 
historical research (as opposed to Justice Marshall’s poorly informed and 
culturally biased preconceptions)—to a richly detailed account of life at the 
time of colonization.  In the course of these excerpts, Cronon masterfully 
highlights the governance structures of the different communities and 
reinforces an important point: resource governance institutions form an 
important part of the fabric of every community. 
Students quickly recognize that there are many effective ways to govern 
resources.  European settlers transplanted much of their community structure 
and institutions, including property regimes based principally (although not 
exclusively) upon private property and market exchange.  They established 
fixed settlements based on agriculture and domesticated grazing animals.  
Their intensive farming methods and their enclosure of the land with fences 
soon reshaped the landscape and ecology of New England. 
By contrast, native villages throughout the New England region 
incorporated the annual cycles of wild migratory birds, mammals, fish and 
shellfish into their dietary patterns.  In areas south of the Kennebec River in 
Maine, native communities also raised crops as part of their annual cycle. 
These patterns were supported by complex institutions—in which property was 
often held collectively—that were adapted to the native communities’ seasonal 
mobility and land uses.13  Individuals had clear and full ownership rights in 
things they made,14 but given the limitations on the accumulation of 
belongings imposed by a mobile lifestyle, individual ownership was largely 
limited to functional objects used in a person’s tasks.  Even with such items, 
sharing was common.  With regard to land, kinship groups, not individuals, 
often had territorial claims.15  In southern New England, families had exclusive 
use of land for planting and habitation, although these lands were used only for 
a few years and then left barren until natural processes rejuvenated the 
 
 12. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY 
OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). 
 13. See id. at 58-68. 
 14. Id. at 61. 
 15. Id. at 58-59. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] REUNIFYING PROPERTY 605 
productivity of the soil, after which the lands could be claimed by others.16  
The right was really only a usufruct; no permanent boundaries were marked 
and the identities of the users of the land would shift over time.  The Indians 
also had relatively flexible notions of rights in other productive lands, such as 
clam banks, hunting grounds and berry-picking areas.  The Indians had rights 
to what they gathered, captured or made (for instance, canoes), but only a 
temporary use right in the land itself.17 
Thus, the puzzle that we formulated at the outset—How can the same 
resources— the land, wild animals, fruits and berries, forest resources, fish, 
ocean resources, dwellings, tools—be governed so differently across 
communities?—has an answer, but not the one suggested by Justice Marshall.18  
Cronon’s account reveals that there is not a one-to-one relationship between 
governance institutions and resources.  Both societies developed successful, 
although not necessarily compatible,19 resource governance institutions.  
Although the nature of the resources played some role in how they were 
governed, a set of other factors—knowledge, history, technology, community 
size and religious beliefs—played an important role in determining the 
institutions used to govern resources.  For example, colonists’ knowledge of 
metallurgy afforded them the axe, which made possible splitting of wood for 
fence posts, and thus individual parcels for intensive agriculture and raising 
livestock.  Similarly, the Indians’ knowledge of the seasonal food chains 
resulted in mobile societies that did not rely on fixed land boundaries and 
relatively little private property. 
 
 16. Id. at 62. 
 17. CRONON, supra note 12, at 63. 
 18. As Cronon reveals, the Europeans’ views were driven more by their own cultural 
preconceptions than the actual living standards of native communities.  The native peoples lived 
in a manner that provided sustenance and security, although in dramatically different ways than 
the colonists sought to satisfy their human desires.  The native communities had customs and 
governance structures highly attuned to the seasonal cycles of their regions.  As Cronon explains, 
“[j]ust as a fox’s summer diet of fruit and insects shifts to rodents and birds during the winter, so 
too did the New England Indians seek to obtain their food wherever it was seasonally 
concentrated in the New England ecosystem.”  Id. at 37.  To take advantage of these cycles, 
native peoples developed a mobile lifestyle.  Villages, consisting of extended kinship groupings 
ranging up to a few hundred members, migrated in regular annual patterns among ecological 
niches most hospitable for food gathering and production. 
 19. The differences in property institutions played an important role in the tensions that 
arose between native and colonist communities.  The seasonal and usufructory understandings of 
property rights among native peoples conflicted with the notion of absolute and exclusive rights 
in land of the Europeans, resulting in tension over the meaning of land transactions.  See id. at  
69-70. 
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B. The Triadic Relation 
Cronon’s account leads naturally to an understanding of property as shaped 
by a triadic relation among the nature of the resource, the cultural dimensions 
of the society, and the society’s choice of governing institutions (see Figure 1, 
infra).  A governance structure for a particular resource comprises the 
combination of institutions—social, background legal (default rules), market 
(contract), and political (legislation or administrative control, meaning, 
zoning)—controlling that resource.  Our initial premise is that such governance 
structures are determined by the nature of the resource itself and the attributes 
of the society or culture in which the resource is situated.  The nature of the 
resource relates principally to its technical attributes, such as the difficulty of 
capture, its use, its regenerative ability and its interaction with other resources.  
Even in the case of land, there is a remarkable complexity and variation of the 
resource as reflected in Cronon’s elaboration of native communities’ complex 
methods of land use.  The attributes of the society are also critical to the 
governance regime, in that its culture—broadly defined and reflected in the 
cohesiveness of the members, knowledge base (relating to resources, 
technology and experience with alternative governance institutions), religious 
beliefs, social values, system of political organization and size of the 
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The central story of Cronon’s book—“Changes in the Land (or ecology)” 
of New England following colonization—demonstrates that the triadic relation 
is not static, but dynamic.  The patterns of native peoples—particularly their 
mobility and limited resource use—minimized human effects on ecosystems,20 
notwithstanding a native population in the region of 70,000 to 100,000 
inhabitants at the turn of the seventeenth century.21  By contrast, the 
transplantation of English customs and property institutions, especially private 
property in land, supported a more fixed lifestyle and encouraged intensive use 
of the resource base.  Even though the population of colonists had not yet 
reached 100,000 by the turn of the eighteenth century,22 English settlements 
had already altered the ecology of New England in dramatic and irreversible 
ways.  By the end of the eighteenth century, 
[l]arge areas particularly of southern New England were now devoid of 
animals which had once been common: beaver, deer, bear, turkey, wolf, and 
others had vanished.  In their place were hordes of European grazing animals 
which constituted a heavier burden on New England plants and soils.  Their 
presence had brought hundreds of miles of fences.  With fences had come the 
weeds: dandelion and rat alike joined alien grasses as they made their way 
across the landscape.  New England’s forests still exceeded its cleared land in 
1800, but, especially near settled areas, the remaining forest had been 
significantly altered by grazing, burning, and cutting . . . . 
  Deforestation had in general affected the region by making local 
temperatures more erratic, soils drier, and drainage patterns less constant.  A 
number of smaller streams and springs no longer flowed year-round, and some 
larger rivers were dammed and no longer accessible to the fish that had once 
spawned in them.  Water and wind erosion were taking place with varying 
severity, and flooding had become more common.  Soil exhaustion was 
occurring in many areas as a result of poor husbandry, and the first of many 
European pests and crop diseases had already begun to appear.23 
In other words, the colonists’ culture and governing institutions eventually 
changed the resource.  Accordingly, Figure 2 reorients the triadic relation to 
illustrate this temporal dimension.  In essence, changes in the nodes of the 
triadic relation—resources, culture and institutions—induce changes in the 
other components of the framework.  Over time, resources and culture not only 
determine governance structures, but governance structures also affect the 
resource base and the culture.  Moreover, such feedback loops play an integral 
role in the evolution of the governance of resources.  By learning Property 
through this representation, law students come to appreciate the dynamic 
 
 20. See id. at 53. 
 21. Id. at 42. 
 22. CRONON, supra note 12, at 42. 
 23. Id. at 159-60. 
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nature of resource governance institutions, and are better prepared for the 
practice of law, where they will need to work effectively with various 
governance institutions—courts, social organizations, markets and business 





















We bring out these dynamic elements throughout the course.  Take, for 
example, the classic case of Pierson v. Post,24 which explores the rules 
governing ownership of captured animals.  This nineteenth century gem 
illustrates many lessons about judicial reasoning, the origins of legal doctrines 
and the rules governing wild animals at the turn of the nineteenth century, but 
it would be wholly misleading to leave students with the impression that this 
decision still governs ownership of wild animals to any significant degree.  
Partly in response to the devastating effects of population growth and new 
technologies (such as more accurate firearms and more effective means for 
safeguarding chickens—such as chicken wire) on wildlife populations, the 
institutions governing wildlife evolved dramatically and now provide for the 
regulation and conservation of wildlife.25  Toward the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, the state ownership doctrine eventually resulted in the 
 
 24. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y.  Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 25. See generally DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2002); Dean Lueck, Wildlife Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 696-700 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Dean Lueck, Property Rights and 
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formation of state game agencies.  In 1916, the United States entered into the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act establishing joint control with Mexico and Canada 
of migratory birds.  In 1973, the United States passed the Endangered Species 
Act, which protects endangered species and their habitats.  In that same year, 
the Convention in International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) was 
established to stop trade in endangered species.  Thus, over the course of two 
centuries, the governance of these resources dramatically shifted in response to 
changes in the nature of the resource as well as the societies in which they 
were situated. 
II.  ASSEMBLING THE PROPERTY COURSE 
There remains the practical question of how to organize the diverse topics 
and concepts of property law.  Governance institutions provide the answer.  
Much of the traditional common law material—acquiring property, forms of 
property, scope and limitations of property rights and transferring property—fit 
within a chapter on traditional legal institutions—what we refer to as 
“background legal rules.”  A chapter on social norms, using a range of case 
studies, illustrates circumstances in which informal governance mechanisms 
operate, how they form and evolve, and their relationship to formal means of 
governance.  A chapter on market institutions draws together those bodies of 
doctrine relying principally upon market exchange—landlord-tenant, non-
possessory interests and common interest communities.  The study of common 
interest communities provides an ideal transition to the final chapter on 
political institutions.  This chapter focuses on zoning as a means for exploring 
the strengths and limitations of administrative and quasi-democratic means of 
governing resources. 
By the end of the course, students understand that just as there is more than 
one way to skin a cat (a regrettable, but apt, metaphor), there is more than one 
way to govern a resource.  Although some property books illustrate this point 
by juxtaposing nuisance law, non-possessory interests and zoning, none makes 
this point generally and all typically omit the role of informal governance 
institutions (social norms); nor do they compare the applicability of different 
governance regimes to non-land resources, such as intellectual property, water 
or oil and gas.  Yet these are critical lessons for students as they prepare for 
upper level courses and the practice of law.  Even in our ostensibly private 
property system, where one would expect markets to dominate, resources are 
governed by a confluence of background legal rules, social norms and political 
institutions, as well as markets. 
Thus, we feel that the best method of organizing a property course is on the 
basis of the major governance institutions: background legal rules (principally, 
although not exclusively, common law doctrines), social norms, markets and 
political institutions.  At the beginning of each unit, we present the general and 
distinctive features of the institutional mechanism and decisional processes.  
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As the course proceeds, we contrast the different institutional structures.  Thus 
the comparative institutional character of the course expands as the course 
progresses, enabling students to grasp the full institutional panorama by the 
end of a one-semester course.  In the real world with all of its complexities, of 
course, the governance of resources cannot always be neatly divided among 
particular institutions.  Landlord-tenant law, for example, is a mixture of 
markets and politics (such as rent control boards).  Property disputes between 
neighbors may involve some combination of background legal rules (such as 
trespass and nuisance) and social norms.  But identifying traditional areas of 
property law with the dominant governance institution helps students both to 
understand the particular rules in a larger context and to see the limitations of 
that institution and the ways the law has adapted accordingly. 
The following sections explain how we implement our framework and 
where and how we integrate fundamental concepts within a property course 
structured around governance institutions. 
A. Chapter 1: An Introductory Exploration 
To provide students with the conceptual structure for the property course, 
we begin, as noted above, with the story of early New England.  We preface 
these materials with a brief overview of the principal philosophical 
justifications for property: Locke’s labor theory, personhood, distributive 
justice and utilitarianism.  Many law students have been exposed to some of 
this material in their undergraduate programs and a brief refresher focused on 
the justifications for property ownership provides a common vocabulary for 
understanding particular rules and approaches.  For students without previous 
exposure to this material, the primer serves as a valuable introduction to 
argumentation and moral reasoning. 
The major focus of the introductory chapter is the comparative case studies 
of resource governance in colonial New England.  We augment this descriptive 
material with one of the major theories of the origins of private property: 
Demsetz’s account of the evolution of private property.26 
The last part of our introductory chapter presents three concise case studies 
involving ownership of complex ocean resources: whales,27 oysters28 and 
lobsters.29  Each of the case studies illustrates distinctive governance structures 
that vary with the resource and the community in which the resource is 
governed. 
 
 26. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
 27. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the 
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989). 
 28. Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the 
Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & ECON. 521 (1975). 
 29. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). 
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This introductory chapter exposes students to the richness and range of 
property institutions and the ways in which governance of resources affects 
societies.  For many students, these materials serve as a valuable bridge from 
their liberal arts undergraduate studies—history, anthropology, philosophy, 
literature, economics, sociology and political science—to their legal studies.  
They also emphasize the role of philosophical and analytical frameworks in 
understanding and guiding the development of law. 
B. Chapter 2: Background Legal Rules: Common Law Courts and Default 
Legal Rules 
The first year of law school traditionally has revolved around the role of 
common law courts in developing the legal rules governing adjudication of 
private disputes.  We consider these rules—as developed by common law 
courts and as codified by modern legislatures or harmonized through 
restatements—as the foundation for understanding the default governance 
regime.  They form the essential fabric upon which parties assess options.  
Parties may choose to go beyond these rules in their dealings, they may seek to 
craft their own governance regimes through contract, or they may, in the 
absence of constitutional or other limitations, use political processes to 
override these rules.  But these rules, typically as administered by courts, 
establish default entitlements and remedies. 
We have organized the coverage of these rules in both a chronological and 
practical manner.  We begin with the rules governing the general means for 
acquiring resources—discovery or conquest, adverse possession (in the case of 
land)—and then examine a range of important resources beyond the context of 
land—wild animals, water, oil and gas, and intellectual resources (ideas, 
creative expression and trademarks).  The cases and text emphasize how the 
nature of the resource (is it easily captured by others?) as well as the culture 
(does the society strongly favor development and will it tolerate substantial 
differences in wealth?) affect the governance rules.  For example, the relative 
scarcity and abundance of water led to different governance regimes in the 
west and the east (prior appropriation doctrine versus riparian rights), and the 
social goal of rewarding productive labor led to the “rule of capture” early in 
the development of oil and gas law as well as in intellectual property law. 
We next examine forms of ownership—present and future interests, as well 
as concurrent ownership.  Although there is not much theoretical cohesion to 
the particular rules—mostly, we have simply inherited them—certain rights 
and remedies, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities or the Rule Against 
Restraints on Alienation, reflect culturally specific policies, such as owner-
sovereignty and utilitarianism.  After introducing the importance of efficiency 
through the articles by Coase and Calabresi and Melamed, we also consider 
rights and limitations on ownership.  Trespass is basic in a private property 
regime—the right to exclude is the most fundamental stick in the bundle 
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according to the Supreme Court—but common law remedies of injunctive 
relief are modified by a variety of modern doctrines and statutes (such as good 
faith improver laws) that seek to achieve other goals.  Nuisance also is seen 
through the lenses of efficiency and transaction costs, especially in the context 
of multi-party disputes (which may lead to hold-outs and free riders).  We 
introduce takings doctrine through several cases both because of its 
fundamental importance, but also to show the difference between a liability 
rule (just compensation) and a property rule (blocking government 
appropriation of the land), and the limitations of the latter approach.  Finally, 
we look at the restrictions that civil rights laws impose on owner autonomy to 
achieve social goals wholly apart from efficiency. 
The chapter concludes with a unit on the distinctive rules developed for the 
transfer of property interests—caveat emptor, statute of frauds, title, delivery 
and foreclosure of security interests.  The materials focus on land transactions, 
although we discuss as well the rules for registration and recordation of other 
interests, such as intellectual property. 
C. Chapter 3: Social Norms 
Background legal rules and institutions provide an important part of the 
governance structure, yet they hardly tell the entire story. 
Most people do not take their disputes to lawyers or judges.  Norms, rather 
than laws, provide the rules of conduct; friends, relatives, and coworkers, 
rather than juries, make findings of fact; shame and ostracism, rather than 
imprisonment or legal damages, punish the wrongdoer.  Court is held not in a 
courthouse, but in homes, workplaces, and neighborhoods, among networks of 
kin, friends, and associates.  In a sufficiently close-knit group, where norms are 
well defined and nonlegal sanctions are effective, the law has little impact on 
behavior.30 
This chapter explores the role of social norms and institutions in defining and 
governing property.  In some contexts, social norms and institutions augment and 
shape the operation of background legal rules, markets and political institutions.  In 
others, they operate independently of these institutions. 
Social norms govern resources in a variety of ways.  For example, they 
may influence the propensity of individuals to use formal legal mechanisms.  
Sociologists have found that many businesspeople involved in long-term 
relationships will use formal legal sanctions only as a last resort.31  Social 
norms similarly operate within families, firms, organizations and religious and 
 
 30. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] REUNIFYING PROPERTY 613 
social communities to allocate and enforce property interests and control social 
behavior. 
Unlike the study of formal rules, the study of social norms cannot focus 
upon statutory codes or court opinions.  Rather, the principles underlying their 
operation must be gleaned from the contexts in which social norms and 
institutions have developed.  We begin with Professor Robert Ellickson’s 
pathbreaking study of the manner in which trespass disputes are handled in a 
rural ranching community.32  We then turn to Professor Elinor Ostrom’s 
influential work on how voluntary organizations have evolved to address the 
tragedy of the commons in a wide variety of “open access” settings.33  The next 
two case studies look at the manner in which social norms have addressed the 
appropriability problems posed by intellectual property,34  and how formal 
legal rules have evolved in response to these social institutions.35  The last case 
study looks inside the operation of law firms to understand the role social 
norms play in structuring incentives in the workplace.  Through these case 
studies, students are able to identify the conditions fostering the formation and 
operation of social norms and institutions, how such norms and institutions 
evolve, how they interact with formal legal institutions and whether they 
effectively govern the allocation of property in a particular setting. 
D. Chapter 4: Market Institutions 
The fourth chapter focuses on the role of markets in allocating rights to 
material resources. Although a separate first-year course, namely Contracts, deals 
with market institutions in some detail, this chapter focuses on the distinctive 
contractual and quasi-contractual rules developed for governance of particular 
resources.  In particular, we focus on landlord-tenant law, the law of 
non-possessory interests and the law governing common interest communities 
(such as condominiums, cooperatives and gated communities)—three areas of 
property law in which contractual instruments are widely if not universally used to 
reorder the bundle of property rights, and where common law and statutes have 
significantly constrained the types, content and enforcement of agreements. 
Although voluntary agreements underlie each of these areas of property law, 
such agreements alone could result in intolerable inequities or inefficiencies.  In 
the context of landlord-tenant law, the cases, statutes and materials explore the 
problems of unequal bargaining power in residential landlord-tenant law and the 
 
 32. ELLICKSON, supra note 3. 
 33. OSTROM, supra note 3. 
 34. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
 35. Compare Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d 
by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), with Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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common law and statutory responses (such as the warranty of habitability and 
retaliatory eviction).  The law of non-possessory interests allows landowners 
voluntarily to coordinate land uses to obtain mutually beneficial results—results 
that might not otherwise be possible without owning much larger tracts of land.  
However, this area of law is broader than traditional contract law in that 
agreements made by predecessors can bind successors (real covenants, equitable 
servitudes).  The reason is clear: the high transaction costs that would arise if 
covenants expired with each change of ownership would quickly lead to inefficient 
land use arrangements.  In the area of easements, the law has developed 
contractual constructs even in the absence of voluntary agreements.  The doctrines 
of easement by implication and easement by necessity mimic the results of formal 
agreements, whereas the doctrine of prescriptive easements establishes equivalent 
rights to serve utilitarian purposes.  A new but important kind of easement—the 
conservation easement—extends the reach of agreements well beyond the 
contractual nexus to promote specific policy aims.  The law of common interest 
communities is perhaps the most extensive form of contractual property 
governance, in which individuals create a quasi-democratic system through 
contractual agreement and live within a hybrid form of governance.  Such 
communities are increasingly common and present novel and difficult challenges 
to traditional doctrines.  Here, we look both at the agreements themselves, as well 
as at different models of judicial review.  This area is also a natural transition to 
the last chapter, focusing on political institutions. 
E. Chapter 5: Political Institutions 
This chapter explores the fourth major institutional structure governing the 
allocation of resources in society—political institutions—particularly in the 
context of municipal regulation of property rights in land.  After looking at 
important theories of political participation—pluralism, civic republicanism—and 
the Tiebout Hypothesis for competing municipal governments, we examine the 
basic tools for land use planning and zoning, as well as the limits imposed by the 
Takings Clause.  The materials and cases illuminate not only the basic rules of 
zoning law, but also the political dynamics of bargaining, the problems raised by 
conflicts of interest and the constraints imposed by the Takings Clause.  The 
materials highlight the attributes of political institutions and, coming at the end of 
the course, foster discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
the full range of resource governance institutions. 
III.  CONCLUSIONS 
The study of property law, along with its centrality to the law school 
curriculum, has drifted over the past century.  Property courses have devolved 
into disparate sets of loosely connected topics, and the case for treating 
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Property as an essential building block for the study of law has become more 
tenuous. 
Allowing the property course to recede from the core first-year curriculum, 
however, would undermine our mission to provide students with a strong 
foundation and to develop a deep intuitive grasp of the practice of law.  
Without foundational training and analytical constructs, law school becomes a 
glorified bar review course and our students would be unprepared to practice in 
the increasingly diverse world of law. 
The challenge to unify the disparate field of property is reminiscent of 
Goldilocks and the three bears: avoiding porridge that is too hot or too cold.  A 
framework that is too abstract melds the field of property into pure 
philosophical debate or general discussion of law and public policy.  A course 
without any abstraction offers no framework at all; it is an ad hoc collection of 
topics and concepts—just another opportunity to learn rules with a vague 
admonition to “think like a lawyer.” 
The triadic framework, with its emphasis on the evolution of governance 
regimes, offers the right balance of abstraction and concreteness.  All lawyers 
today must understand the range of institutions.  The governance of most 
resources provides a rich, comparative laboratory for learning how the 
principal institutions function.  In addition, the variation among resources and 
the communities in which they are situated provides an opportunity to explore 
how the nature of the resources and culture influence governance regimes as 
well as their evolution over time.  Thus, even though it is not possible to 
examine in detail the vast range of resources in any single course, the property 
course can provide students with a vocabulary, a set of analytical concepts and 
a range of examples for understanding the key determinants of resource 
governance. 
The triadic relation integrates the many dimensions of property law within 
a framework that is socially meaningful, intuitively appealing, cohesive and 
relevant to the multi-faceted nature of being a lawyer—advisor, litigator, 
dispute resolver, business decision-maker and politician.  In so doing, the 
triadic framework builds a bridge from the origins of the law school 
curriculum to the modern world, reinvigorating the role of Property in the 
study of law.  It also has the capacity to evolve as resources and institutions 
change over time. 
The triadic relation offers a conception of Property that directly connects to 
the role that lawyers play in a modern society: creating, implementing and 
guiding governance structures.  Rather than focusing upon one particular 
resource, such as land, or a particular institution, such as common law courts, 
the triadic framework emphasizes the portfolio of governance institutions and 
how they can be deployed to govern the range of resources.  The triadic 
relation provides a balanced appreciation of the full range of institutional 
settings.  Furthermore, by explicitly recognizing the role that culture plays in 
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structuring institutional approaches, the triadic framework emphasizes the 
importance of contextual understanding of legal problems.  Taking culture 
seriously is critical to analyzing the needs of particular clients faced with 
particular problems. 
 
